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RECENT CASES
RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION OF ARREST RECORDS-AN ARRESTEE HAS NO RIGHT TO THE RETURN OR DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARREST RECORD
SUBSEQUENT TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM-Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859,
553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
On July 22, 1972, Joseph A. Loder attacked a San Diego
police officer as the officer was beating Mrs. Loder with a
nightstick. Loder was arrested and charged with battery, obstructing a police officer and disturbing the peace. The incident was subsequently reported to the San Diego Police Department, and the officer was temporarily suspended from
duty.'
The charges against Loder were dismissed by the municipal court for lack of prosecution, subsequent to the San Diego
City Attorney's decision not to pursue the matter.2 This dismissal was followed by Loder's motion before the municipal
court for an order compelling the police to erase the record of
his arrest. The order was denied on the basis that there was no
statutory authority to support such an order, and the subsequent appeal to the appellate department of the superior court
was dismissed on the ground that the ruling was non3

appealable .

Thereafter, having failed to elicit any response by writing
directly to the chief of police and the records custodian with a
request for the erasure of his arrest record and forbearance in
its transmittal to federal agencies, Loder filed an action for a
writ of mandate in the superior court. The superior court found
that the respondents would not disseminate Loder's arrest record to the public in general, and relying on Sterling v. City of
Oakland,4 denied the writ.' On appeal, in an unanimous deci1. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 862, 553 P.2d 624, 626, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 464, 466 (1976).
2. The plaintiff executed, concurrently with and in consideration for the dismissal of the charges against him, a covenant not to sue in which he agreed not to
pursue any claim for damages against the police officer. Id.

3. Id.
4.
5.

208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
17 Cal. 3d at 863, 553 P.2d at 627, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
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sion written by Justice Mosk, the California Supreme Court
held that an arrestee has no right to compel the return or destruction of his arrest record subsequent to a dismissal of the
charges against him.'
The court began its consideration with a cursory glance at
the requirements for a writ of mandate; noting essentially that
a writ will issue only "to compel the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station . . . ." The court noted that no statute
exists in California which requires the return or erasure of an
arrest record. On the contrary, according to the court, compliance with such a request is apparently prohibited by Government Code section 6200, which prohibits the destruction or
removal of public records by public employees charged with
their retention.'
Finding no statutory duty, the court's focus shifted to two
constitutional issues. The plaintiff argued that his constitutional rights of privacy and due process of law had been violated, and that the respondents, by taking an oath to uphold
the federal and state constitutions, were under a duty to prevent constitutional violations. The court reached only the first
premise of this argument.
The court dispensed with the due process portion of the
plaintiff's argument in a single footnote' leaving isolated the
6. Id. at 877, 553 P.2d at 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
7. Id. at 863, 553 P.2d at 627, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (emphasis added), quoting
CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 1085 (West 1955). The court clarified these requirements,
quoting People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 491, 487 P.2d
1193, 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 (1971): "Two basic requirements are essential to the
issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of
the respondent . . .; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to
the performance of that duty .
17 Cal. 3d at 863, 553 P.2d at 627, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 467 (citations omitted).
8. 17 Cal. 3d at 863-64, 553 P.2d at 627, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 467. See CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 6200 (West 1966). Courts have been reluctant to grant expungement of arrest
records in the absence of some express statutory authority. See Herschel v. Dyra, 365
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz.
438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr.
696 (1962).
9. 17 Cal. 3d at 864, 553 P.2d at 627, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
10. According to the court, the basis of the plaintiffs due process argument was
his legitimate concern to protect himself from improper uses of his arrest record. See
text accompanying note 21 infra. The court found the argument unpersuasive due to
the existence of various legislative safeguards (see text accompanying notes 22-27
infra), and the fact that the claim was vaguely worded. 17 Cal. 3d at 868 n.4, 553 P.2d
at 630 n.4, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470 n.4.
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issue of whether or not official retention and dissemination of
arrest records is a violation of the right of privacy.
The right of privacy was added to the California Constitution by amendment in 1972, and reworded in 1974.11 An ac-

knowledgment by the court of the existence of this constitutional right of privacy was followed by its finding, based on
White v.Davis,'" that the right is relative. In White the court
noted: "[Tihe amendment does not purport to prohibit all
incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest."' This
formulation from White served as the framework for the Loder
court's treatment of the privacy issue.
The respondents asserted a compelling interest which, as
articulated generally by the court, was founded in the promotion of more efficient law enforcement and criminal justice.
"[M]ore specifically," the court pointed out, "the state's purpose is to protect the public from recidivist offenders."" Believing the interest in the promotion of more efficient law enforcement and criminal justice to be manifest, the court discussed
several possible governmental interests in the legitimate use of
arrest records.
The governmental interests discussed by the court were:
first, the necessity of identifying the arrestee at the time of his
arrest;" second, the social interest in prompt and accurate pubil. Section one of the California Constitution, as reworded in 1974, reads: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1 (emphasis added).
12. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). White was decided
after the Loder case was accepted for hearing, but prior to its decision. The case
involved a taxpayer's suit against a chief of police and sought to enjoin the expenditure
of public funds for covert intelligence gathering being carried on by the police at a local
state university. It was alleged that the police activity violated the right of privacy of
the students attending the university. The defendant's demurrer was sustained by the
superior court, but the California Supreme Court reversed.
13. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (emphasis added). The
court's holding as to the parameters of the right of privacy was based primarily on
arguments set forth in an election brochure distributed in support of the amendment
and which represented, according to the court, the only legislative history available.
14. 17 Cal. 3d at 864, 553 P.2d at 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468. The court's general
characterization of the state's interest is that which has been most often recognized in
cases dealing with arrest record retention. See United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp.
804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); People v.
Lewernz, 42 Il. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963).
15. 17 Cal. 3d at 864-65, 553 P.2d at 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
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lic reporting of arrests;"6 third, the usefulness of the information derived from an arrest as an aid to the investigation and
solution of crimes in the future;' 7 fourth, the usefulness of an
arrest record as an investigative tool for the discovery of further
evidence;'" and fifth, the possible use of arrest records at pre
and post trial proceedings.'" The court believed that these
many uses taken together, constitute a substantial governmental interest.2"
Against this governmental interest the court balanced the
potential dangers which surround the improper use of arrest
records. The principal dangers, according to the court, are
"inaccurate or incomplete arrest records, dissemination of arrest records outside the criminal justice system, and reliance
on such records as a basis for denying the former arrestee business or professional licensing, employment, or similar opportunities for personal advancement." 2 ' The realization that
these potential dangers warranted legitimate concern
prompted the court to recognize the development of a body of
legislation which has tended to minimize these dangers. The
legislation cited by the court included: first, provisions mandating that certain arrests shall be recorded as detentions
rather than as arrests;2" second, procedures to insure that re16. The court quoted Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 536, 483
P.2d 34, 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1971), in recognition of a social interest in the
indentification of adults currently charged with the commission of crimes. 17 Cal. 3d
at 865, 553 P.2d at 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
17. 17 Cal. 3d at 865, 553 P.2d at 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
18. The court explained that often a prior arrest is not an isolated event but
rather one of a series of arrests of the same individual from which a pattern may arise;
the court suggested as an example a particular modus operandi. Such a pattern may
form the basis for suspecting the arrestee if a similar crime is committed in the future,
and may, if coupled with some independent evidence of criminal involvement, amount
even to probable cause for arrest. Id. at 865-66, 553 P.2d at 628-29, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
468-69.
19. The court noted that at the pretrial stage arrest records may be used in
exercising prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to file a formal charge, prosecute as a felony or misdemeanor, plea bargain, or allow admission into some special
program. Arrest records are also used in considering the appropriateness of pretrial
release, whether such release should be on the arrestee's own recognizance or on bail,
and, if necessary, the amount of the bail. Upon conviction, arrest records are used in
determining whether to grant probation, and later, whether to grant parole. Id. at 86668, 553 P.2d at 629-30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70.
20. Id. at 868, 553 P.2d at 630, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470. See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 13100 (West Supp. 1977) (effective July 1, 1978).
21. 17 Cal. 3d at 868, 553 P.2d at 630, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470. An exhaustive
bibliography of articles relevant to the dangers discussed in the text was provided by
the court. Id. at 868-69 n.5, 553 P.2d at 630-31 n.5, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71 n.5.

22.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§§ 849.5, 851.6(b), (d) (West Supp. 1977).
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cords are complete;23 third, the enactment of a detailed mechanism to allow individuals to inspect their own criminal records;24 fourth, statutes that mandate the sealing of arrest records in certain contexts; 5 fifth, the establishment of numerous safeguards against the improper dissemination of arrest
records;" and sixth, legislation preventing the use of criminal
records as a basis for denying former arrestees opportunities for
personal advancement. 7 In addition to playing a part in the
balance between the governmental interest and those of an
arrestee, this body of legislation was used by the court to distinguish a line of cases that have allowed expungement, but which
according to the court, were not subject to a body of protective
legislation similar to California's. 8
The articulation of the legislative protections outlined
above completed the court's discussion of the balance between
the interests of the state and those of the arrestee, and led the
court to conclude that the state's interest was compelling in
this case. Further, the court pointed out that in the only prior
reported California decision directly on point, Sterling v. City
of Oakland," the court of appeal reasoned that regulation of the
use of arrest records was primarily a matter for the legislature.
The Loder court adopted the Sterling rationale0 and noted
additionally that it has been reiterated in several of California's sister jurisdictions. 3
The plaintiff offered two arguments in an attempt to rebut
the court's adoption of the Sterling view. The plaintiff's first
assertion was that the right of privacy has been accorded increased recognition since the date of Sterling. The court answered this by noting that the legislature has kept pace with
this increased recognition as indicated by the elaborate structure of enactments on the topic. The plaintiff's second argument, that the absence of a provision for expungement in this
23.

Id. §§ 11115-11116.

24. Id. §§ 11120-11126.
25. Id. §§ 851.7, 1203.45, 11105; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp.
1977).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(b) (West Supp. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1107511081, 11105, 11141-11143 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 7 (1975).
27. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 461, 475(c), 480(a), 490 (West Supp. 1977); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § I000.5 (West Supp. 1977).
28. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
29. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
30. 17 Cal. 3d at 876, 553 P.2d at 636, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
31. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
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type of case resulted from a legislative oversight, was answered
by the court with a discussion of legislative history in which it
32
found the omission to be deliberate.
The court, in commenting further on the plaintiff's second
argument, stated that if the legislature had in fact made an
oversight the court "should nevertheless allow the Legislature
to address in the first instance the difficult task of striking the
proper balance between these competing concerns. ' 33 The
court concluded: "[Iun either event [intentional or unintentional omission] . . .judicial intervention is unwarranted. ' 34
Thus, the responsibility for determining the appropriate balance on the issue of the privacy of arrest records was shifted to
the legislature, notwithstanding the fact that the major part of
the court's opinion was an attempt to strike that balance.
The opinion concluded with a categorization of cases from
jurisdictions other than California. The first category consisted
of cases in which expungement had been granted. These cases
were distinguished by the court on the ground that they were
from jurisdictions which lack statutory protections similar to
those afforded an arrestee in California. 3 The second category,
also consisting of cases in which expungement had been
granted, was distinguished on the ground that its cases involved wholesale arrests of unpopular groups for purposes of
harassment, a practice which, in the court's view, did not constitute a lawful state interest.3 6 In its final category the court
found that for the most part the courts of other jurisdictions,
both state and federal, have held that the right of privacy is
not violated by the limited retention and dissemination of arrest records.3 7 The court joined the jurisdictions of this final
32. 17 Cal. 3d at 876, 553 P.2d at 636, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 876, 553 P.2d at 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
35. Id. at 877 & n.22, 553 P.2d at 637 & n.22, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477 & n.22.,
36. Id. at 877 & n.23, 553 P.2d at 637 & n.23, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477 & n.23.
37. Id. at 877 & n.24, 553 P.2d at 637 & n.24, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477 & n.24. Among
the cases cited in footnote 24 appeared what might be considered the federal counterpart to the Loder decision, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, decided just
six months prior to Loder, the respondent had been arrested by a private security
policeman for shoplifing. He pleaded not guilty to the charge against him and it was
"filed away with leave to reinstate." Over a year later the arrestee's name and photograph appeared in a flier distributed by the police for the purpose of alerting merchants
to possible shoplifters who might be operating during the Christmas season. Shortly
after this flier appeared the charge against the arrestee was dropped. The respondent
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974), alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court found, among other things, that the "interest in
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category, and on finding that no statutory or constitutional
grounds existed for a writ of mandate, refused to issue one.

In the absence of legislative action, and with the possible
exception of those unlawfully arrested,3" future arrestees desiring the destruction or erasure of their arrest records will be
without remedy. Although such a result may seem untenable
to some," the court's opinion was the product of extensive research and shows little internal weakness in analysis.40 Only
the reality that the legislative safeguards do not afford the
protection that the court claimed for them, can be used to
4
attack the decision. 1
Kenneth E. Aalseth
reputation alone" did not fall within the area of either "liberty" or "property," areas
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution, and thus there was no violation
of due process; and that although the Court has recognized that certain .'zones of
privacy' may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees," the respondent's
case does not fit within one of those areas.
38. The comment added by the court in distinguishing the cases involving wholesale arrests for purposes of harassment-that such arrests are "clearly not a lawful
state interest"-might be taken to indicate that when faced with an illegal arrest the
court will allow the return or erasure of the record. See note 36 supra.
39. See 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash.
App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
40. It appears that the Loder court considered nearly all the relevant case law
and commentary on the subject of arrest record retention and dissemination. See 17
Cal. 3d at 868-69 n.5, 877 nn.22-24, 553 P.2d at 630-31 n.5, 637 nn.22-24, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 470-71 n.5, 477 nn.22-24.
41. No empirical evidence was found to support such a contention. The effectiveness of the legislative protections espoused in the Loder decision is certainly open to
question. First, in a practical sense, how effective are they in deterring the misuse of
arrest records? And second, is the effectiveness of these protections thwarted when
records are transmitted to federal agencies and from there possibly to organizations
located within jurisdictions not regulated by legislation similar to California's? See
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 722 (D.D.C. 1971).
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INTERROGATION-STATEMENTS OBTAINED BY IRS
SPECIAL AGENTS DURING THE COURSE OF A NONCUSTODIAL INTERVIEW WITH TAXPAYER UNDER
CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AT
SUBSEQUENT TAX FRAUD TRIAL EVEN THOUGH THE
AGENTS DID NOT GIVE. FULL MIRANDA WARNINGS
-Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
On August 2, 1972, two special agents of the Intelligence
Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) met with petitioner Alvin Beckwith in a private home where he occasionally
stayed.' The agents sat down with the petitioner, introduced
themselves, presented their credentials and informed him that
they had been assigned to investigate his federal income tax
liability for the years 1966 to 1971. The senior agent then read
to Beckwith, in accordance with IRS instructions, all his
Miranda rights, save the right to appointed counsel.2
Beckwith acknowledged that he understood his rights. The
agents then proceeded to interview him and later characterized
the conversation as friendly and relaxed.' The petitioner conceded that the agents did not press him on any question he
could not or chose not to answer.
1. United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Tax cases are referred to the Intelligence Division if, during the course of a civil audit conducted to
determine if any deficiencies exist in a taxpayer's reported liability, the revenue agent
discovers the possible existence of fraud. If the Intelligence Division decides that a
preliminary investigation is warranted, a special agent, who is essentially a criminal
investigator, will be assigned to the case to gather sufficient evidence to justify a
criminal prosecution. Hewitt, The ConstitutionalRights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud
Investigation, 44 TAXEs 660, 661 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hewitt].
2. At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a special agent is required to give the
following modified version of Miranda warnings in accordance with News Release No.
IR-949, issued on Nov. 26, 1968:
As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws and related offenses.
Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit any
information if such answers or information might tend to incriminate you
in any way. I also advise you that anything which you say and any
information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal
proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may,
if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 343 (1976), quoting IRS News Release No.
IR-949, Nov. 26, 1968.
3. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 343.
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Before concluding the interview, the senior agent requested that Beckwith allow the agents to inspect certain of his
records. Beckwith indicated that they were at his place of employment and agreed to the agent's viewing them there. Upon
meeting Beckwith at his office, the senior agent advised him
that he was not required to furnish any books or records. The
petitioner, nevertheless, complied with the request.4
Prior to trial, Beckwith moved to suppress all statements
he made to the agents and evidence derived from those statements on the ground that he had not been given his complete
Miranda warnings.5 The district court denied the suppression
motion. Although ruling that Beckwith would be entitled to
Mirandawarnings in a custodial situation, the court found that
"on this record. . . there is no evidence whatsoever of any such
situation."' The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.7 The
appellate court agreed with the district court's literal interpretation of Mirandathat a suspect must be afforded his Miranda
rights when, but only when, he "has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."' The appellate court likewise concurred with the district
court's analysis that Miranda warnings were not required because "Beckwith was neither arrested nor detained against his
will." 9 The Supreme Court, in Beckwith v. United States, affirmed. 0
The plaintiff argued that the purpose of Miranda and the
meaning of the custodial language was to safeguard a potential
defendant's fifth amendment rights at the time an investigation becomes adversarial in nature. Support for this view may
be found in Miranda, where the court equated custodial interrogation to an investigation that has "focused on an accused.""
Beckwith contended that at the time of the interview the IRS
4. Id. at 344.
5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court held that
when a person has been taken into police custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way, the following warnings must be given prior to questioning: (1) that he has the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him; (3) that he has the right to have an attorney
present; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.
6. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 344 (quoting the district court's
finding).
7. 510 F.2d at 743.
8. Id. at 742, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
9. 510 F.2d at 742.
10. 425 U.S. at 348.
11. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966).
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agents were seeking damaging evidence against him and were
thus acting as adversaries, a condition sufficient to trigger the
need for Miranda warnings."
Petitioner relied on United States v. Dickerson'3 for the
position that Miranda warnings were required in a noncustodial tax interrogation. In Dickerson, a taxpayer whose case
had been referred by a revenue agent to the Intelligence Division was contacted by a special agent, who identified himself
by title, but failed to advise the taxpayer either that the investigation had become criminal or that he had constitutional
rights to remain silent or to seek counsel.' 4 Dickerson argued
that he was entitled to Miranda warnings when first contacted
by the special agent after the case had been transformed into
a criminal fraud investigation.
The Dickerson court stressed the Warren Court's
"overriding concern with the opportunity for intelligent exercise of constitutional rights"' 5 as the basic premise for its
Miranda holding.' 6 Consequently, the Dickerson court declared
that this same premise should control its decision: "We understand the teaching of Miranda to be that one confronted with
governmental authority in an adversary situation should be
accorded the opportunity to make an intelligent decision as to
the assertion or relinquishment of those constitutional rights
designed to protect him under precisely such circumstances."'
The Supreme Court in Beckwith, however, refused to extend the Miranda and Mathis v. United States'" decisions to
12. See 425 U.S. at 345, wherein the Court recognized the petitioner's argument:
He correctly points out that cases are assigned to the Intelligence Division
only when there is some indication of criminal fraud and that, especially
since tax offenses rarely result in pretrial custody, the taxpayer is clearly
the "focus" of a criminal investigation when a matter is assigned to the
Intelligence Division. Given the complexity of the tax structure and the
confusion on the part of the taxpayers between the civil and criminal
function of the Internal Revenue Service, such a confrontation, argues
petitioner, places the taxpayer under "psychological restraints" which
are the functional, and, therefore, the legal, equivalent of custody.
13. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. Id. at 1113.
15. Id.
16. Chief Justice Warren observed in Miranda: "For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise." 384 U.S. at 468. He further noted:
"[Tlhis warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced
with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting
solely in his interest." Id. at 469.
17. 413 F.2d at 1114.
18. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Mathis narrowly held that the
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include noncustodial tax investigations even where the investigation has focused on the suspect, because to do so "would cut
this Court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its
own explicitly stated rationale."' 9 Beckwith characterized the
concern of the Miranda court as that of safeguarding constitutional rights during an "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere." ' " Although recognizing that a noncustodial interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere might sometimes be characterized as a situation where "the behavior of.

.

.law enforcement

officials was such as to overbear [one's] will to resist and
thereby bring about confessions not freely self-determined,'',
the Court found thai the circumstances of the tax investigation
in Beckwith were not coercive in nature."
Only Justice Brennan, in his dissent, recognized that even
though he is not in custody in the physical sense, a tax suspect
confronted by IRS agents in the apparent security of his home
or office may still experience the "psychological restraints"
inherent in a custodial situation.23 To begin with, the tax suspect is confronted by law enforcement officials, albeit in civilian garb, and to the extent he feels compelled to submit to their
questioning, that compulsion may act as a coercive influence. 4
The taxpayer may, in fact, feel free to cooperate because he is
laboring under the mistaken belief that a civil audit is still
being conducted. Moreover, this false sense of security is enhanced by special agents who may present themselves as
genial, affable people, yet do little to dispel the illusion that the
taxpayer may be able to settle his deficiency without risking
Miranda requirements are applicable to interviews with Internal Revenue agents concerning tax liability when the subject is in custody. There, however, a revenue agent
obtained incriminating statements from a defendant already incarcerated for a separate offense. What the Court meant by its holding was that it was immaterial why the
person was in custody; the very fact of his being in custody triggered the need for
Miranda warnings.
19. 425 U.S. at 345.
20. Id. at 346, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
21. .425 U.S. at 348, quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961). See
also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553
(D.C. CIR. 1970); People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1966).
22. See 425 U.S. at 348.
23. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. In fact, few taxpayers know that they may refuse to answer questions and
may lawfully deny access to their personal books and records absent a search warrant.
Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigation, 53 A.B.A.J. 517, 519
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Lipton].

720
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criminal prosecution. 5
Some courts have recognized the psychological pressures
compelling the tax suspect to cooperate with the IRS and have
held that Miranda warnings are required once the taxpayer
becomes the focus of a criminal investigation." The great majority, however, have rejected this analysis on the basis that
there is no significant deprivation of freedom in the criminal
tax investigation and therefore no real potential for coercion. 2
Many commentators have criticized this narrow interpretation
of Miranda because it fails to take into account the compulsion
2
inherent in the tax fraud investigation. 1
25. The criminal aspects of a tax fraud case supercede the civil aspects, as the
IRS is intent upon making an example of tax evaders in order to encourage public
respect for the tax laws and to deter similar violations. Therefore, steps related to the
assessment and collection of any civil tax liability normally are held in abeyance
pending disposition of the criminal phase.
The policy of the IRS as set forth in its Audit Division Manual, chapter 4500, P4560-3 (approved 1960) provides that:
[ileopardy and deficiency assessments will not be made, waivers and
consents will not be requested, statutory notices of deficiency will not be
issued nor will any other action be taken with respect to the civil liability
in cases in which a recommendation for criminal prosecution is likely or
has been made, if such action would imperil successful criminal investigation.
Lipton, The Relationship Between the Civil and Criminal Penalties for Tax Frauds,
1968 U. ILL. L.F. 527, 532.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States v. Turzynski,
268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The Turzynski court concluded that:
The formal, internal shift from Internal Revenue Agents to Special
Agents of the Intelligence Division converts the investigation from civil
to criminal. At this point the taxpayer is under suspicion of tax fraud,
the investigatory power of the government is directed against him with
the intent of developing evidence to convict him and his need to know
his rights is quite as real and urgent as that of the suspect under custodial
interrogation.
Id. at 854.
27. In fact, every circuit except the Seventh Circuit has held Miranda inapplicable to noncustodial criminal tax interrogations. See United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d
1017 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d
759 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); United States v. Ramantanin, 452
F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Jernigan,
411 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1969); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968);
Spinney v. United States, 385 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968).
28. See Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under
Escobedo and Miranda: The "CriticalStage," 53 IOWA L. REv. 1074 (1968); Hewitt,
supra note 1; Lipton, supra note 24; Comment, The Right to Counsel: Its Application

1977]

BECKWITH v. UNITED STATES

Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to definitively establish whether Miranda was applicable to the noncustodial tax fraud investigation, ironically, it created several
problems which may lead to further litigation. First, Beckwith
creates inconsistent standards of constitutional protection for
tax suspects and traditional criminals. Second, it fails to state
whether the IRS published procedures are to be given the same
force of law as the Miranda warnings have been given. Third,
appellate courts must decide on an ad hoc basis whether the
voluntariness of any statement is vitiated by evidence of coercion, thus assuring inconsistent application of the Beckwith
rule. Fourth, Beckwith fails to reconcile the basic conflict between its holding and the United States v. Heffner rationale,"9
which requires administrative officials to strictly adhere to
their agencies' directives.
First, because the taxpayer is seldom subjected to traditional custody, the Beckwith decision creates different standards of constitutional protection for tax suspects than for
those suspected of committing violent crimes, even though the
criminal sanctions for tax crimes can be just as severe as those
for violent crimes. For example, the government can employ
the evasion statute, section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code,30 which provides that a willful attempt "in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax . . .or the payment thereof" is a

felony punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
Furthermore, as a result of Beckwith and the IRS practice
of interrogating in the field, the tax suspect's rights now consist
of those rights recognized before Miranda. Prior to that landmark case, courts generally held that agents of the Internal
Revenue Service had no duty to inform the taxpayer of his
and Interpretation During a Criminal Tax Investigation, 19 CATH. U.L. REv. 540
(1970); Note, Exclusion of Confessions Obtained Without Miranda Warnings in Civil
Tax Fraud Investigations, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1288 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Tax FraudInvestigations]; Comment, ConstitutionalRights of a Taxpayer in a Criminal Tax Investigation, 16 J. PUB. L. 403 (1967). But see Note, The Miranda Warning
and the Tax Fraud Investigation, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 596 (1970).
29. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). See note 42 and
accompanying text infra.
For a thorough discussion of the Heffner rationale and its applicability to tax fraud
investigations, see Comment, Miranda and the IRS: Protecting the Taxpayer by Administrative Due Process, 24 AM. L. REv. 751 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Administrative Due Process]. But see Note, Tax FraudInvestigations, supra note 28
(critical appraisal of doctrine's applicability to tax fraud investigations).
30. I.R.C. § 7201.
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privilege against self-incrimination or of the transformation of
a civil audit into a criminal fraud investigation." In the absence of coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, evidence submitted "voluntarily" was deemed admissible even though the
taxpayer was not notified of the shift in the nature of the investigation nor warned of his constitutional rights." The voluntariness test provided that if a person accused of crime volunteered evidence, a conscious waiver of his constitutional rights
was not essential for the admissibility of that evidence in a
criminal trial. 3 The Supreme Court in Miranda sought to
eradicate the imprecision and inherent unfairness of the
"voluntariness" test 4 by laying down a strict code of
conduct
for law enforcement officials when interrogating suspects. The
Beckwith decision revives the voluntariness test in the tax
fraud situation.
The second defect in the opinion is the Court's failure to
address the issue of whether the IRS procedural guidelines provide an adequate and effective guarantee of the suspect's constitutional rights. At least two courts have found that they do
not. " The Beckwith Court, however, merely makes passing ref31. See, e.g., United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408, 414-15 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1954).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964); Grant v.
United States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1961); Greene v. United States, 296 F.2d 841 (2d
Cir. 1961).
33. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912); United States v. Burdick,
214 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1954).
34. Under the voluntariness test, the determination as to the admissibility of
statements made or evidence derived therefrom is dependent on a continuing
"reevaluation of the facts of each case as to how much pressure on the
suspect was
permissible." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in the original). Factors to be taken into account are (a) threats or imminent
danger, (b) physical deprivations such as lack of sleep or food, (c) repeated or extended
interrogation, (d) limits on access to counsel or friends, and, (e) individual weakness
or incapacities. Id. at 508.
Justice Harlan observed: "Apart from direct physical coercion ... no single default or fixed combination of defaults guaranteed exclusion and synopses of the cases
would serve little use because the overall gauge has been steadily changing usually in
the direction of restricting admissibility." Id.
Chief Justice Warren, in his majority opinion, commented: "The voluntariness
doctrine in the state cases . . . encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely
to exert such pressures upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and
rational choice." Id. at 464.
On the shortcomings of the voluntariness test, see generally Kamisar, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"Fifth Amendment and the
Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 94-104 (1966).
35. See United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
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erence to the IRS warnings by stating that "[piroof that some
kind of warnings" were given . . . would be relevant evidence
only on the issue of whether the questioning was coercive." 3 7
Further, it is unclear whether or not the present IRS warnings
would be sufficient if the interrogation were custodial.
Third, by stating that appeals brought by taxpayers arguing coercion in noncustodial situations should be examined on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether statements are given
voluntarily, the Court has created a catalyst for inconsistent
application of the Beckwith rule. Federal courts will have to
apply a balancing test to determine whether a statement was
coerced. The test might well weigh the extent to which IRS
agents comply with their published procedures against the
courts' belief as to what constitutional rights, if any, should be
afforded tax suspects in noncustodial situations.3 8 Policy considerations, such as the promotion of effective enforcement of
the tax laws or a general distaste for white-collar crime, will
also be influential. The balancing test, then, will be as wide as
the courts wish it to be, thereby assuring disparate outcomes
despite any similarities in fact situations.
Finally, a significant question left unanswered is whether
the IRS must warn those interrogated in noncustodial settings
in order to comply with IRS guidelines even though the warnMapp, 406 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The Oliver court attacked the adequacy of
the warnings:
By informing Oliver that he need not give answers that might be incriminating, the agents seemed to suggest that he could be compelled to answer nonincriminating questions. This was hardly the "clear and unequivocal" warning of the right to remain silent required by Miranda ....
Additionally, the agents never ascertained whether Oliver understood the
warnings. Miranda places "a heavy burden" on the government to show
that a suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. . . . It is somewhat surprising to find that, some six
years after Miranda, and three years after Dickerson the IRS continued
to utilize warnings that failed to comply in these significant respects with
the Supreme Court's mandate.
505 F.2d at 304 n.6.
36. Presumably, the Court was referring to the type of warnings given by the
agents in Beckwith.
37. 425 U.S. at 348.
38. Courts previously considering the question as to whether evidence is admissible when gained in the absence of exact conformance with the IRS procedural guide.
lines have generally held that substantial compliance with them renders the evidence
admissible. United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Mathews, 464 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bembridge, 458 F.2d 1262
(1st Cir. 1972).
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3" The
ings are not compelled by Miranda.
Service has emphasized that the IRS procedures, in contrast to formally adopted
regulations, carry only the weight of a press release. 0 Thus,
those procedures should not be held to the same due process
requirements that apply to formal regulations." The Beckwith
decision incidentally strengthens the IRS position by apparently sweeping away any remaining constitutional basis for
arguing that the IRS warnings are legally required in a noncustodial situation. Since the IRS warnings essentially conform to
the Miranda warnings which the Court found inapplicable,
then a fortiori, the IRS is not constitutionally compelled to
follow those guidelines.
In United States v. Heffner,4" however, the Fourth Circuit
held that the IRS was required, as a matter of administrative
due process, to strictly comply with the guidelines it had promulgated.4 3 Thus, even though Miranda would not require
warnings in a noncustodial situation, the IRS guidelines and
the Heffner decision may.
Although the Supreme Court in Beckwith has rejected
Dickerson, it has not rejected Heffner. Since the IRS procedural guidelines found controlling there instruct special agents
to give the essential Miranda rights at their initial contact with
the taxpayer, the Beckwith decision would seem to be without
practical effect in those circuits that apply the Heffner ration39. At least one tax fraud case has been decided since Beckwith which sheds
some light on how courts may respond to the Beckwith Court's avoidance of this
question. In People v. Myers, 39 I1. App. 3d 411, 349 N.E.2d 658 (1976), the court held
that, under Beckwith, neither Miranda nor modified Mirandawarnings need be given
before interrogating a taxpayer under investigation-even if criminal in nature-where
the taxpayer is not in custody and there is no evidence of coercion. Id. at 415, 349 N.E.
2d at 662.
40. See Comment, Administrative Due Process, supra note 29, at 763.
41. See id. at 763-64.
42. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). In Heffner, a taxpayer appeared voluntarily at
the Internal Revenue office and was interviewed by special agents who neither identified themselves as criminal investigators nor advised the taxpayer of his right to retain
counsel. Nine months later, the defendant was again interviewed without receiving a
warning as to the purpose of the inquiry or his right to have counsel present. Although
the first interview occurred before the promulgation of the procedural instructions
issued by the IRS, the agents requested that the taxpayer sign a written transcript of
the first interview, and that action, the court held, gave rise to an obligation to give
the required warnings. Id. at 813. The Heffner court, basing its decision on United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), stressed that "an agency
of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations or procedures which it
has established. When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it
down." 420 F.2d at 811.
43. 420 F.2d at 811-12.
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ale. However, only three circuits have accepted the Heffner
approach," while several have flatly rejected it.4"
The significance of the Beckwith decision is that in those
federal jurisdictions unwilling to accept the Heffner rationale
of strict compliance with administrative procedures, taxpayers
suspected of criminal violations may be susceptible to the same
"psychological restraints" which compelled the Miranda Court
to define a strict code of conduct for government officials investigating criminal suspects in custodial situations or under custodial circumstances. For the minority of jurisdictions accepting Heffner, it remains for the Supreme Court to resolve the
basic conflict between that holding and its recent holding in
Beckwith so that IRS agents and taxpayers alike may have
their constitutional rights and duties clarified.
Richmond Martin Flatland
44. See United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
In Leahey, IRS agents met with the defendant without disclosing, as required by
IRS procedure, that they were investigating possible criminal tax fraud. At a second
meeting, bank statements and books were obtained from the taxpayer by the special
agents without mention of the criminal nature of the investigation or any other warnings. The court held that the failure of the agency to conform to its announced procedure was sufficient grounds to uphold the trial court's suppression of the evidence
gained. The court reasoned that the agency had a duty to conform to its procedure,
that citizens have a right to rely on conformance, and that the courts must enforce both
the right and the duty. Id. at 11.
In Sourapas, the special agent informed the defendant that his function was to
investigate violations of the internal revenue laws, but did not specifically advise him
that he was there to conduct a criminal investigation. Relying upon Leahey and
Heffner, the court held that the IRS is bound by its own regulations even though they
go beyond the Miranda requirements. 515 F.2d at 298.
45. See Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Potter, 385 F. Supp. 681 (D. Nev. 1974); United
States v. Fukushima, 373 F. Supp. 212 (D. Hawaii 1974); United States v. Luna, 313
F. Supp. 1294 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
In both Potter and Fukushima the special agents substantially complied with the
IRS guidelines, but failed to inform the tax suspect as to the criminal nature of their
investigations. Both courts denied the suppression motion on the principle that the
IRS publication of investigative procedures does not raise those procedures "to the
stature of constitutional rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
385 F. Supp. at 687; 373 F. Supp. at 218.
The Luna court stated: "The Constitution and laws of necessity dictate preconditions for the admissibility of evidence in a federal trial; administrative agencies may
not." 313 F. Supp. at 1295.
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION-GOING AND COMING
RULE LITERALLY APPLIED-SPECIAL RISK AND SPECIAL MISSION EXCEPTIONS NARROWLY CONSTRUED-General Insurance Company of America v.
Worker's CompensationAppeals Board (Lilla Chairez), 16 Cal.
3d 595, 546 P. 2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
Edward Chairez, employed as a delivery man for a Los
Angeles medical equipment company, arrived early one Saturday morning, as was his custom, to make coffee for the employees. Coffee and an urn were provided by the employer and
Chairez had a key to the front door. He parked his car immediately across the sidewalk from the front door of the business on
La Cienega Boulevard. There was no employee parking provided by the employer and employees normally parked on side
streets as parking on La Cienega Boulevard was restricted to
one hour except on Saturdays. Chairez was standing next to his
car when both he and his automobile were struck by an uninsured motorist. Chairez died as a result.'
Chairez's widow brought an action to receive compensation under the worker's compensation laws.' The worker's compensation referee, the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board
and the court of appeal concluded that Chairez's death was
compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment.3 However, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "going and coming" rule applied; that neither the
"special risk" nor "special mission" exceptions were applicable, and that therefore the death was not compensable. 4
The California Labor Code provides that injured employees may be compensated for injuries or death "arising out of
and in the course of employment."5 This language has gener1. General Ins. Co. of America v.Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lilla Chairez),
16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
2. CAL. LAB. ConE § 3600 (West 1971).
3. General Ins. Co. of America v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 123 Cal. Rptr.
913, rev'd, 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546 P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
4. 16 Cal. 3d at 600-02, 546 P.2d at 1363-65, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419-21.
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971) states in part:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, ...

shall,

without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for an injury
sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes
death, in those cases where the following conditions of compensation
concur:
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ally been construed to mean that the employee must be acting
within the scope of his authority or assignment, within the time
period of his employment and at the place where he may reasonably be for that purpose.'
Rules have developed through judicial interpretation of
the "arising out of and in the course of" requirement. One of
the most basic is the "going and coming" rule which precludes
compensation for injury suffered during the course of a local
commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. 7 For purposes of this
rule the employment relationship does not begin until the employee enters the employer's premises.'
In the instant case, the court began its analysis by restating the "going and coming" rule and noting that the premises
line, as an absolute boundary, provides objectivity and fairness
in determining the point at which employment begins. The
court criticized the blurring which results from a more subjective rule allowing recovery for injuries occurring within a
"reasonable distance" of the employer's premises. The court
quoted one authority's description of the problem: "Each time
the premises are extended a 'reasonable distance', there will
inevitably arise new cases only slightly beyond that point and
the cry of unfairness of drawing distinctions based on only a few
feet of distance will once more be heard." 9 Applying the premises line strictly the court found that since Chairez had not
b) where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing
service growing out of and incidental to his employment and is acting
within the course of his employment.
c) where the injury is proximately caused by the employment,
whether with or without negligence.
6. Robbins v. Yellow Cab Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 811, 193 P.2d 956 (1948); Melgar
v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 476 (1968). See 2 W. HANNA,
CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES & WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 9.01(1)(b) (2d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as HANNA].
7. Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d 150, 157, 501 P.2d 1176,
1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461 (1972); Ocean Acc. & Guar. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
173 Cal. 313, 321, 159 P. 1041, 1044 (1916).
8. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 28 Cal. 2d 329, 336,
170 P.2d 18, 23 (1946).
The rationale for the rule is that the relationship of employer and employee is
suspended when the employee is off duty and does not re-attach until he resumes work.
In addition, no service growing out of employment is being rendered while the employee is traveling between home and his fixed place of employment. Ocean Acc. &
Guar. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 173 Cal. 313, 322, 159 P. 1041, 1044 (1916). See
HANNA, supra note 6, at § 9.03(3)(b).
9. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15.12 (1972) [hereinafter cited

as

LARSON].
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entered his employer's premises, the "going and coming" rule
applied and his widow could not be compensated unless the
circumstances fit within one of the exceptions to the rule."°
The court first dealt with the "special risk" exception. If
an employee is injured due to a special hazard that is both
causally related to employment and to which he is subjected,
"peculiarly or to an abnormal degree," the injury will be compensable, even though it occurred off the premises." The California cases have applied the special risk exception only when
the risk was required as part of the job, for example where the
only manner of ingress and egress to an employer's premises
presents a peculiar risk. 2 Finding that Chairez was not exposed
to a greater risk from passing motorists than anyone else on La
Cienega Boulevard that morning, the court held that his death
did not come within the second requirement of the exception,
because no risk distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater
than that shared by the public existed.' 3
The court then focused on the "special mission" exception
which makes an injury compensable if an employee is performing a special mission at the request of his employer although
also commuting to or from work." The "special mission" must
be the major factor in the employee's journey and must be
extraordinary in relation to his routine duties. 5 The majority
10. 16 Cal. 3d at 600, 546 P.2d at 1363, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
11. Freire v. Matson Navig. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941). The risk must
have a close causal connection to the employment. The exception is applied only to
the particular hazard and is not used to mark out a reasonable distance for all injuries.

See

LARSON,

supra note 9, at § 15.31.

12. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 27 Cal. 2d 813, 167 P.2d 705
(1946); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170
P.2d 18 (1946); Walker v. City & County, 97 Cal. App. 2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950).
13. 16 Cal. 3d at 601, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
14. See HANNA, supra note 6, at § 9.03(3)(iv).
15. Schreifer v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 289, 295, 391 P.2d 832, 835,
38 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964) (employee requested to arrive earlier than scheduled
shift). See also Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 962, 471 P.2d 988,
991, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 191 (1970) (traveling to various work sites may be made part of
working day by contract); Garzoli v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 502,
467 P.2d 833, 86 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (policeman required as a practical matter to wear
uniform while traveling, rendering him available for citizens' requests for help); Arboleda v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 253 Cal. App. 2d 481, 61 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967)
(must be something more than reporting for a scheduled work assignment; exception
not applicable when employee is returning for second shift in one day); Shell Oil Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Betty Byrd), 199 Cal. App. 2d 426, 18 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1962)
(a return trip to pick up car was dictated as a practical matter although not officially
required); Los Angeles Jewish Community Council v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 65, 209 P.2d 991 (1949) (employee deviated from regular time and duties for
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opinion in General Insurance viewed Chairez's early arrival to
plug in the coffee pot as "an ordinary commute for the purpose
of performing an ordinary chore,"'" undertaken at the choice of
the employee and not at the request of the employer. Therefore,
the court held the special mission exception inapplicable.
Justice Tobriner, in dissent, argued that the "special
mission" exception should apply because Chairez was performing a service, extraordinary in relation to his routine duties, of
incidental benefit to his employer and at the implied request
of the employer." He noted that the majority was ignoring the
California Supreme Court's own precedent in relying upon the
absence of a direct request by the employer, in ignoring the
benefit received by the employer of the employee's services and
in neglecting the judicial principle that "[a]ny reasonable
doubt as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment in view of this state's policy of liberal construction in
favor of the employee, should be resolved in favor of the employee."' 8
The approach of the supreme court was entirely different
from that of the compensation referee, the Appeals Board and
the court of appeal. The appellate court accepted as persuasive
the analysis of Professor Larson who, in response to the problems of extending the premises line a reasonable distance, developed a different test. He suggested that
[t]he concept of "course of employment" follows that of
"arising out of employment"; that is the employmentconnected risk is first recognized and then a course of employment theory must be devised to permit compensation
for that obviously occupational risk ....
We have then a workable explanation of the exception
to the premises rule; it is not proximity, or reasonable
distance or even identifying of surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that when a court has satisfied itself
that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the condition under which claimant must
sole purpose of helping in employer's business); Fenton v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 44
Cal. App. 2d 379, 112 P.2d 763 (1941) (errand to be performed at an unusual time).
16. 16 Cal. 3d at 602, 546 P.2d at 1365, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
17. Id. at 603, 546 P.2d at 1366, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
18. Id. at 604, 546 P.2d at 1366-67, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23, citing Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 26 Cal. 2d 509, 514, 159 P.2d 625, 628 (1945).
See also Dimmig v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 860, 865, 495 P.2d 433,
101 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1965).
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approach and leave the premises and the occurence of the
injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends
as far as those conditions extend.' 9
Applying this particularization of the general quantum theory
of work connection to Chairez' situation, the appellate court
found the facts to be saturated with work connectedness and
distinctly arising out of, and therefore in the course of, employment. The appellate court thus saw no need to be limited by
the confines of the "going and coming" rule."° The supreme
court rejected this approach, quoting Larson only to the extent
of his description of the problems of reasonable distance, and
assumed the applicability of the "going and coming" rule from
the fact that Chairez had not entered the employer's premises
at the time of the injury. The supreme court attached no importance to the work connectedness of the facts."
Given the judicial development in this area of worker's
compensation law, the California Supreme Court could have
granted compensation in General Insurancewithout stretching
precedent. Historically the case law has developed in favor of
gradually expanding the circumstances in which compensation
would be allowed. This is especially true where the facts
showed course of employment, but application of a rigid
premises line would preclude recovery." The courts approved
of "reasonable distance" language, allowing a reasonable margin of space and time as within the course of employment. 3
Likewise, a policy of case-by-case review somewhat supplanted the rigid application of the rule. 4 Frequently, in a
particularly appealing fact situation the courts relied on Labor
Code Section 3202 favoring liberal construction of the course of
employment language in favor of the employee. 0
19. LARSON, supra note 9, at §§ 29.00-29.10.
20. 123 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975).
21. 16 Cal. 3d at 600-02, 546 P.2d at 1363-65, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419-21.
22. Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d 150, 155, 501 P.2d 1176,
1179, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 499 (1972) (and cases cited therein) (discussion of the historical development of the "going and coming" rule and its exceptions).
23. Lewis v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 542 P.2d 225, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1975); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 28 Cal. 2d
329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946); California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n
(Cooper), 21 Cal. 2d 751, 135 P.2d 158 (1943); Gardner v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73
Cal. App. 2d 361, 166 P.2d 362 (1946).
24. Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928); Enterprise Foundry Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 206 Cal. 562, 565, 275 P. 432, 434 (1929); Makins v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 198 Cal. 698, 703, 247 P. 202, 204 (1926).
25. Garzoli v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 502, 467 P.2d 833, 86
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With regard to its interpretation of premises line in
General Insurance the court states, "Although broad language
in some cases seemingly extends the 'premises line' the language must be read in context and when this is done, it becomes apparent the cases are fully consistent.""6 Those cases
using the "reasonable margin approach" 7 upheld compensation for an employee who had entered an employee parking lot
and was injured while going from the lot to the work station on
public streets;28 for the employee whose car was half into the
employee parking lot and half in the street;" and for the employee who parked early in order to have coffee .3 The cases are
consistent with General Insurance in that employee parking
lots are considered the employer's premises and a parking lot
was not available to Chairez. However, had the court focused
on work connectedness, as did the appellate court, rather than
the premises line and its exceptions, there would be no resulting discrepancy with prior cases."
In the same manner the court's reading of the special exception is technically correct, but a different result could have
been reached based upon prior decisions. The California Supreme Court has twice held that the making of a left turn on a
public street into the employer's premises in the face of oncoming traffic exposed the employee to a particular risk not shared
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). See also Lewis v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559,
542 P.2d 225, 125 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1975) (reasonable space and time margin springs from
liberal interpretation mandate); Scott v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 173,
294 P.2d 1039 (1956) (required plaintiff to proceed through workers compensation
rather than civil negligence).
26. 16 Cal. 3d at 599, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
27. Lewis v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 561, 542 P.2d 225, 226,
125 Cal. Rptr. 353, 354 (1975):
Guided, however by the legislative mandate favoring liberal construction
of the Worker's Compensation Act (Labor Code §3202), we have defined
the course of employment in this context to include "a reasonable margin
of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done." (California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (Cooper), 21 Cal. 2d 751, 135 P.2d 158 (1943)).
28. Lewis v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 542 P.2d 225, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1975).
29. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170
P.2d 18 (1946).
30. Van Cleve v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 261 Cal. App. 2d 228, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 757 (1968).
31. Lewis v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 559, 542 P.2d 225, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1975) (compensation upheld for employee injured on public streets three
blocks from the business premises).
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by the public generally. 2 The appellate court in General
Insurance interpreted these decisions to mean that the special
risk may be the same kind and character as those shared by
other commuters and focused on the work related peculiarities
by which Chairez came to be in that place at that time.3 3 The
California Supreme Court chose not to apply the "special risk"
exception because even though it was the most practical
choice, Chairez was not required to park in front of the building
and subject himself to risk of heavy traffic.
The court likewise could have applied the "special
mission" exception in keeping with precedent. The rule is
stated in Dimmig v. Worker's CompensationAppeals Board:
[W]hen an employee engages in a special activity which
is within the course of his employment and which is reasonably undertaken at the request or invitation of the
employer, an injury suffered while traveling to and from
the place of such activity is also within the course of the
employment and is compensable. 4
Additionally, Boynton v. McKales states, "It is not necessary
that the servant is directly engaged in the duties which he was
employed to perform but included also are missions which incidentally or indirectly contribute to the services or incidentally
benefit the employer."35 The California Supreme Court has
also held that a request can be implied where a requirement
that employees have cars was implicit rather than explicit. 36 As
Justice Tobriner argued in dissent, Chairez was performing a
service that was a benefit to his employer and with the employer's approval if not direct request; "under these circumstances a direct request by the employer that the employee
perform this service was not necessary to bring the trip within
the 'special mission' limitation." 7
The significance of General Insurance is that the court
chose not to stretch the premises line, or to consider La Cienega
32. Greydanus v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490, 407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 384 (1965); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n (Henslick), 28 Cal. 2d

329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946).
33. 123 Cal. Rptr. 913, 917 (1975).
34. Dimmig v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 860, 868, 495 P.2d 433,
439, 101 Cal. Rptr. 105, 111 (1956).
35. Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal. App. 2d 777, 789, 294 P.2d 733, 735 (1956).
36. Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d at 160, 501 P.2d at
1185, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 465 (1972).
37. 16 Cal. 3d at 604, 546 P.2d at 1366, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
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Boulevard a "special mission" exception. The holding is
technically consistent with previous cases but not with the
sympathetic underpinnings of those cases. Clearly, however,
General Insurance will provide a more definite guideline for
courts in the future. The decision indicates a preference by the
present court for more definite, easy to administer rules unblurred by subjective interpretations of premises, special risks
and special errands. The court's concern is that such "widely
varying subjective interpretations" will never cease to enlarge
the area of compensable injury.3" Since the court did not disturb precedent directly, General Insurance may indicate
merely that the court has halted any further expansion of the
range of compensable injuries. On the other hand, the decision
may be indicative of wholesale judicial retrenchment.
Marlene H. Prendergast
38.

Id. at 599, 546 P.2d at 1363, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
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DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY-RETIREMENT BENEFITS WHICH VEST FOLLOWING MARITAL DISSOLUTION ARE DIVISIBLE AS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY TO THE EXTENT THAT
SUCH BENEFITS DERIVE FROM EMPLOYMENT DURING MARRIAGE UNTIL THE DATE OF SEPARATION-In
re Marriage of Smith, 56 Cal. App. 3d 247, 128 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1976).
On December 15, 1954, respondent Titus G. Smith enlisted in the Air Force. Approximately four years later he
married appellant Judith F. Smith. Subsequently, in March
1970, the couple separated. Their dissolution proceeding was
heard and concluded on November 8, 1974, and judgment was
entered on March 7, 1975.'
Following twenty years of Air Force service, the respondent's retirement benefits vested' on January 1, 1975. It had
not, therefore, vested at the time of separation or time of trial.
The respondent had remained on active duty after vesting but
was eligible to retire at his election.3
In the interlocutory judgment, the trial court declared,
"[t]he military retired pay of Respondent is found to be his
sole and separate property as a result of it not having vested
prior to separation of the parties."'
Judith appealed this ruling, and the appellate court in In
re Marriage of Smith then held the retirement pay to be a
community interest up to March 4, 1972,1 the effective date of
amended Civil Code section 5118 which provides that the date
1. In re Marriage of Smith, 56 Cal. App. 3d 247, 248-49, 128 Cal. Rptr. 410, 41011, modified, 3 Civil 15225 (Cal. App., June 9, 1976) [unpublished opinion on file at
SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
2. The right to retirement benefits vests when an employee acquires an irrevocable interest in a fund created by his own contribution and/or the contributions of his

employer. The vesting of retirement benefits must be distinguished from the maturing
of those benefits, which occurs only after the conditions precedent to the payment of
the benefits have taken place or are within the control of the employee. Williamson v.
Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (1962). See also In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635
(1976); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596 n.2, 517 P.2d 449, 451 n.2, 111
Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 n.2 (1974); Brandt, The Identificationand Division of Intangible
Community Property: Slicing the Invisible Pie, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 26, 29 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Brandt]; Kent, Pension Funds and Problems Under California
Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447, 463, 465 (1950).
3. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 249, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 250-51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
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of separation determines the extent of community property.6
The issues the Smith court had to consider were: first,
were Titus' retirement benefits a community asset; second, if
so, at what point did his earnings and accumulations change
from community property to separate property; and third,
what method of allocation should be used to disperse the community property.
In ruling that the retirement benefits were community
property, Smith followed the precedent established just two
months earlier in the landmark decision of In re Marriage of
Brown' which had held: "Pension rights, whether or not vested,
represent a property interest; to the extent that such rights
derive from employment during coverture, they comprise a
community asset subject to division in a dissolution proceed8
ing."
By so holding, Brown overruled' the holding in French v.
French'0 that nonvested pension rights are an expectancy not
subject to division as community property-a ruling which had
been the prevailing authority for thirty-five years. French had
prevented the unmatured pension fund of a Los Angeles police
officer from being considered as community property even
though his contributions to the fund had been made during
seventeen years of marriage and the fund had an actuarial
value of approximately $34,000 at the time of the divorce."
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1976).
However, as discussed below (see text accompanying note 26 infra), Civil Code
section 5118 has recently been held to be retroactive in deciding all property rights not
finally adjudicated as of March 4, 1972. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 594,
546 P.2d 1371, 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (1976).
7. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
The Smith court noted that Brown, "recognizing the many potential difficulties
in this new approach to the determination of rights in nonvested pension funds, ordered a limited retroactive application only." 56 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 128 Cal. Rptr.
at 411.
However, the Brown court's language did embrace the situation in Smith: "Our
decision will apply retroactively, however, to any case in which the property rights
arising from the marriage have not yet been adjudicated, to such rights if such adjudication is still subject to appellate review .
15 Cal. 3d at 851, 544 P.2d at 569,
126 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
8. 15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
9. Id. at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641. Language in those cases
which, based on French, was contrary to the language in the Brown decision was
likewise disapproved. Id. at 851 n.14, 544 P.2d at 569 n.14, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.14.
10. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
11. Id. at 778, 112 P.2d at 237.
12. Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11-12, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 16667 (1962).
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French has received much criticism from the commentators' 3 and has been narrowed by court decisions.' 4 Prior to and
despite these judicial abridgements, proponents of French
continued to argue that the categorization of nonvested pension benefits as community property would restrict the employee's freedom to change his place of employment or retirement benefits' 5 and impose severe administrative burdens on
the court." The Brown court, in reversing French, stated that
if there are uncertainties affecting the vesting or maturation of
the pension, the court can award each spouse an appropriate
portion of each payment as it is paid. 7 Brown noted that court
supervision of apportioned payments would entail no more of
a burden than supervision of alimony payments or the payments of apportioned vested pensions,"' and that the employee
would retain the right to change or terminate employment, to
modify the terms of employment and elect among retirement
programs."'
The Brown decision, used as a basis for the Smith holding,
prevents the inequities which could, and sometimes did, 0
13. See Brandt, supra note 2, at 31-32; Gudebski & Jovovich, Retirement Pay:
A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 354-56 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Gudebski & Jovovich]; Thiede, The Community Property Interest of the NonEmployee Spouse in PrivateRetirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 635 (1971).
14. These decisions have held: (1) that conditions which affect the value of
matured benefits do not affect their classification as community property (see, e.g.,
Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 471, 492 P.2d 13, 20, 99 Cal. Rptr. 324, 332 (1972); In re
Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 30, 101 Cal. Rptr. 242, 243 (1972)); (2) that if
the conditions precedent to the receipt of matured benefits are entirely within the
employee's control, the benefits lose their expectant characteristic and become community property (see, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581, 585, 123 Cal. Rptr.
634, 636 (1975); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 893, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257
(1972)). In addition, courts have been liberal in construing the time during which a
pension may vest and still be considered community property. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Ward, 50 Cal. App. 3d 150, 153, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1975) (retirement benefits
vesting after separation but prior to dissolution of the marriage constitute community
assets).
15. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 639 (1976); Benson v. City of Pasadena, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 361, 384 P.2d 649,
652, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1963).
16. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 639.
17. Id. at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639; see In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 855, 519 P.2d 165, 167-68, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-08 (1974); In re
Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 29, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (1972); Berry v.
Board of Retirement, 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 759, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549, 550 (1972).
18. 15 Cal. 3d at 849, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
19. Id. at 849-50, 544 P.2d at 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
20. See French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941); Williamson v.
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occur in property settlements. For example, if a twenty-five
year marriage ended in divorce before the pension vested, the
wife would receive no part of the pension even though contributions were made during that period, but a second wife who was
briefly married to the husband at the time of the vesting and
then procured a divorce would receive a portion of the pension
as a community asset.
In the instant case, Judith Smith, after having been married to her husband for seventeen years while he contributed
toward the pension benefit, might have been denied a share in
that pension because she and her husband separated approximately five years before the pension vested and concluded their
dissolution proceeding two months prior to that vesting.
Although Brown allowed a non-employee spouse a community interest in the pension rights of the employed spouse,
such interest was limited to the period of coverture. 21 Civil
Code section 5118 had, prior to its amendment in 1971, allowed
the earnings and accumulations of the wife while she was living
separately from her husband to be maintained as separate
property,12 although those of the husband were still considered
community property during that period. 2 The 1971 amendment allows both spouses to preserve as separate property earnings and accumulations attributable to the period of separation. 2 Because the amendment was not effective until March
4, 1972, the Smith court ruled that Judith shared a community
interest in her husband's pension fund until that date. 5
Four days after the Smith decision, however, the California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Bouquet,26 held that
Civil Code section 5118, as amended, governs all property
rights, whenever acquired, that have not been finally adjudicated by a judgment from which the time to appeal has
lapsed.Y Because Smith had not been finally adjudicated as of
March 4, 1972, the California Supreme Court, on May 14, 1976,

Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal.
App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939).
21. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
22. 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340, as amended, CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118
(West Supp. 1976).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5110, 5119(b) (West 1970).
24. Id. § 5118 (West Supp. 1976).
25. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 250-51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
26. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427.
27. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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granted a hearing and retransferred Smith to the court of appeal to be reconsidered in light of Bouquet.
In giving Civil Code section 5118 limited retroactive application, the Bouquet court reasoned that legislative enactments
are presumed to operate prospectively 8 if it is impossible to
ascertain legislative intent.2 9 But the court noted that the intent that the amendment operate retroactively was shown by
a letter from the author of the legislation to the president pro
tempore of the Senate which, in addition to expressing the
author's personal intent that the legislation be retroactive,
stated that he had so argued in obtaining passage of the bill,
and by the Senate's passage of a resolution to publish the letter
in their Journal as a letter of legislative intent.'
In its original decision, the Smith court awarded Judith
162 months of shared interest in her husband's pension. This
162 month figure encompassed the 138 months they lived
together as husband and wife and the 24 months from the time
of separation to March 4, 1972, the effective date of the amendment. 1 In its reconsideration of Smith, the appellate court excluded those latter 24 months from the period of shared interest.2
As briefly discussed earlier, 3 opposition to the consideration of nonvested retirement benefits as community assets was
28. Id. at 587 n.3, 546 P.2d at 1372 n.3, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428 n.3.
29. Id. at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
30. Id. at 588-91 & n.5, 546 P.2d at 1374-76 & n.5, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32 &
n.5. Bouquet also rejected the wife's contention that retroactive application of the
amendment would deprive her of vested property rights without due process; the court
stated: "The state's interest in the equitable dissolution of the marital relationship
supports this use of the police power to abrogate rights in marital property that derived
from the patently unfair former law." Id. at 94, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
434.
31. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
32. 3 Civil 15225 (Cal. Ct. App., June 9, 1976) [unpublished opinion on file at
SANTA CLARA L. REV.]. Because the original Civil Code section 5118 discriminated
against men on the basis of their sex, it rested as the Bouquet court observed, on
constitutionally unsound ground: "It seems doubtful that the state could conjure a
rational relation between this unequal treatment and any legitimate state interest. It
is even less likely that the state could sustain the greater showing required by our
recognition that sex based classifications are inherently suspect." 16 Cal. 3d at 588,
546 P.2d at 1373-74, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
Although the practical effect of amended Civil Code section 5118 will be to give
unemployed wives a lesser share of their working husband's retirement benefits should
they divorce, the statute is ideologically sound in its eradication of gender as the basis
for societal obligations and benefits. One would only hope that this ideology prevails
in all legislative enactments and judicial proceedings and rulings.
33. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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based on the practical difficulties of calculating the value ofand then distributing-an asset which may never vest.' In the
Smith situation, the fund vested, albeit following the separation and dissolution. The court utilized what has been called
the time rule to determine the community's interest in the
retirement fund, a rule whereby the total number of months
prerequisite to the vesting of the fund is divided into the
months of employment during coverture.3 One-half of the resulting percentage figure was Judith's share of the retirement
fund."
There are two arguments against this method of benefit
allocation. First, if the fund has not vested, or has vested but
not matured, the non-employee spouse may have to wait for a
substantial period of time before receiving her/his portion of
the benefits 7 and second, court supervision of monthly payments increases the administrative duties of an already overburdened judicial system.3
Both of these arguments can be met by awarding the pension right to the employee and after establishing an actuarial
equivalent of the retirement benefits reasonably expected to be
paid, awarding property of equal value to the spouse.3"
34. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 639.
35. Thiede, The Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in
PrivateRetirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 635, 654 (1975). In Smith, the 240 months
prerequisite to the vesting of the retirement plan was divided into the 162 months of
marital contribution to obtain a 67.5% community interest. Judith was then awarded
one-half of that percentage, or 33.75% as her portion of what Titus will receive monthly
when he retires. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412. Following the Bouquet
ruling, Judith will be alloted 28.75% (one-half of 57.5% or 138/240) of Titus' monthly
retirement benefits. In re Marriage of Smith, 3 Civil 15225 (Cal. Ct. App., June 9, 1976)
[unpublished opinion on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
36. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412. Although Titus had not retired
and was not receiving benefits himself, the condition precedent to the receipt of those
benefits was entirely within his control and could not, therefore, preclude Judith's
right to receive her benefits. Id. at 249, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 411; see In re Marriage of
Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581, 585, 123 Cal. Rptr. 634, 636 (1975); Bensing v. Bensing,
25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 893, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1972). Had Titus' retirement not
vested, the Smith court would have ordered that payments to Judith be deferred until
the benefit had vested, and had Titus' employment terminated for any reason prior to
vesting, no payment would have been required. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 251 n.3, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 412 n.3.
37. Brandt, supra note 2, at 31.
38. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
39. See Berry v. Board of Retirement, 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 759, 100 Cal. Rptr.
549, 550 (1972); Thiede, The Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee
Spouse in Private Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 635, 662 (1975).
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Even if the fund is vested and has matured at the time of
the lump sum award, there are still problems associated with
this method of allocation: actuarial assumptions are rarely
matched by actual events; there may be no other property
which can be awarded to the non-employee spouse in lieu of an
interest in the pension; and even if such property does exist,
the allocation of all liquid assets to one spouse may be very
burdensome for the other." If the fund has not vested, the
employee spouse may be unfairly required to pay one-half of
benefits he may never receive."
Therefore, the decision by the Smith court to follow Brown
in awarding future pension payments as they fall due,42 appears
to be the most practical and equitable method of allocating
retirement benefits as community assets whether such benefits
are vested or not. As for the obligation of the court to continue
jurisdiction to supervise the payment of these pension benefits,
the claim of administrative burden surely cannot serve to support inequity.
In alloting Judith Smith, as community property, one-half
of the proportion of the pension fund which her husband earned
during coverture but which was not yet vested at the time of
the dissolution of the marriage, and in awarding her these payments as they fell due to her husband, the Smith court has
assimilated Brown, Bouquet, and a practical method of benefit
allocation, culminating over three decades of judicial decisions
which have attempted to disentangle the inequitable quagmire
created by the French ruling.
BarbaraSpector
40. Brandt, supra note 2, at 31.
41. An analogous situation occurred when a defendant-attorney was ordered
to pay $100,000 to the plaintiff because, as her attorney, he had failed to claim her
husband's state and federal pension plan benefits as part of the community property
to be shared at the dissolution of her marriage. The $100,000 figure represented the
combined actuarial value of the husband's state pension, which he was receiving but
which would terminate at his death, and his federal pension, which although vested,
would not mature until 1983. It is significant to note that if the husband should die
prior to the reaching of the age upon which the actuarial figure was estimated, the

wife is placed in a better position than she would have been had she remained married.
See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
42. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 251, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
As for the argument that the non-employee spouse may have to wait a long time
before receiving a share of retirement benefits (see text accompanying note 37 supra),
it has been suggested that the court continue jurisdiction until the actual retirement
of the employee; if then, for example, the non-employee spouse has been receiving
special support until the fund vests, such support will be subtracted from the nonemployee's allotted retirement benefits. Brandt, supra note 2, at 32.

